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CASE NOTE
CARY V BOARD OF EDUCATION: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE
HIGH SCHOOL LEVEL
INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom, now recognized as one of the protected first amend-
ment interests, is a relative newcomer in the catalogue of safeguarded
rights.I Perhaps because it encompasses so many varying interests, its devel-
opment has been piecemeal. 2 While the federal courts have been eager to
recognize the existence of academic freedom, those courts that have grappled
with issues involving this interest have not been able to define its contours.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Car v. Board of Education,3 au-
thored a recent chapter in the continuing development of academic freedom.
A case of first impression, 4 Cag has the potential of foreclosing any right of
high school teachers to select and supplement materials used in their own
classes. Car was a civil rights action 5 in which five high school teachers in
the Aurora, Colorado schools sought a declaratory judgment that their rights
were violated when the school board banned ten books.6 All the books had
been used previously.
7
The trial court found that, although the teachers did have a constitu-
tional right to use the books,8 the right had been waived by the plaintiffs
1. For a comparison of the treatment of academic freedom in two twentieth century cases
decided 41 years apart, see Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) and Epperson v.
Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968), discussed in notes 41-53 and accompanying text infta. See also Van
Alstyne, The Constilutzna/ Rzghts of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 841-47 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Teachers Rights]. See note 41 infia.
2. In addition to teachers and students, other groups often are involved in academic free-
dom controversies. Parents often have been the plaintiffs.in actions involving educational is-
sues. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W.V. 1975), in which the plaintiff-
parents claimed their rights were violated because school textbooks undermined their religious
beliefs and invaded their families' privacy because they were anti-Christian in content. 388 F.
Supp. at 94-95.
See note 88 intha for a discussion of the categories of cases that may be viewed as related to
academic freedom.
3. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
4. Id. at 542.
5. The plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § !343 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977),
afdon other grounds, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
6. 598 F.2d at 536.
7. Id. at 537. The books that were banned had been used in three elective courses for
junior and senior high school students. Id. Those that had been used in contemporary litera-
ture classes were: THE EXORCIST by William P. Blatty; A CLOCKWORK ORANGE, Anthony
Burgess; THE REINCARNATION OF PETER PROUD, Max Ehrlich. Banned from use in contem-
porary poetry classes were: NEw AMERICAN POETRY, Donald Allen; THE YAGE LETrERS, Wil-
liam Burroughs and Allen Ginsberg; CONEY ISLAND OF THE MIND, Lawrence Ferlinghetti;
STARTING FROM SAN FRANCISCO, Lawrence Ferlinghetti; KADDISH AND OTHER POEMS, Allen
Ginsberg; LUNCH POEMS, Frank O'Hara. Outlawed for use in American masters classes was
ROSEMARY'S BABY by Ira Levin. 598 F.2d at 537 n.l.
8. 427 F. Supp. at 953.
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through a collective bargaining agreement between the teachers' union and
the school board.9 The Tenth Circuit, though affirming, found the teachers
had no right to use materials which the board did not approve.o It based its
decision on the rationale that under Colorado law the school board has ple-
nary power over curricular selection."1
I. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Recognition of the idea that learning and teaching-receiving and
transmitting knowledge-are protected interests has been greatest in the
area of higher education; latitude has been widest when the rights of univer-
sity or college professors and students have been involved. 12 When the rights
at stake, however, have been those of teachers whose students are at the ele-
mentary and secondary level, the courts have assumed that the schools are
acting to a large extent in the role of tn laco parentis.1
3
In fact, deference to the rights of parents is the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court's emerging recognition of the special interests of the aca-
demic community in two companion cases that mark the beginning of the
modern trend.' 4 The Court found, in Meyer v. Nebraska 5 and Bartels v.
Iowa,' 6 that the state did not have the right to prohibit the teaching of for-
eign languages.' 7 While the Court indicated that foreign language teachers
had an interest in pursuing their profession,' 8 it relied in large part on the
9. Id. at 955-56.
10. 598 F.2d at 544.
11. Id. at 543.
12. See Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What
They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Publh School Teachers] and
Note, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1049-50, 1067-68 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
13. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), a~fdan other grounds, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 122-28 and accompanying text infra.
14. In Waugh v. Mississippi University, 237 U.S. 589 (1915), which was decided only eight
years prior to the cases marking the beginning of the modern trend, the Court found that the
fourteenth amendment did not prohibit the state legislature from outlawing Greek letter frater-
nities at a state university. Id. at 596. The Court based its holding on a finding that it was
reasonable for a legislature to establish a disciplinary rule designed to make certain the atten-
tion of students was not diverted from their studies. Id. at 596-97.
In a turn-of-the-century case, Ward v. Bd. of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1905), the
discharge of a college professor was upheld without any discussion of constitutional considera-
tions. The circuit found valid a statute giving the board of regents plenary power to remove
professors. Id. at 376. "Questions concerning the efficiency of a teacher . . . his usefulness, his
relations to the student body and to the other members of the faculty, are so complicated and
delicate that they are peculiarly for the consideration of the governing authorities of the institu-
tion." Id. at 377.
As recently as 1937, it was noted in a law journal article that, in teacher discharge cases,
courts did not discuss academic freedom. Note, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 YALE L. J. 670,
672 (1937). The article also stated that university professors had been dismissed because of their
opinions and that "many are inhibited in what they say and write on socially controversial
issues, and in their political activity as citizens, by the fear of academic reprisals." Id. at 670.
For a collection of Supreme Court cases relating to education, see THE SUPREME COURT
AND EDUCATION (Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1976).
15. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a discussion of Meyer by an author who believes the holding
of the case is extremely limited, see Public School Teachers, supra note 12, at 1305-09.
16. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
17. 262 U.S. at 403, 262 U.S. at 411.
18. 262 U.S. at 400-01.
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rationale that parents have a right to educate their children in a manner of
the parents' choosing, and therefore a right to hire a teacher of their
choice.' 9 And, while indicating that the state had gone too far in prohibit-
ing the teaching of foreign languages, the Court held that the state can make
regulations for schools, including prescribing the curriculum for state
schools.
20
Parental rights also played a key role in West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Bamette,2 1 which was another of the stepping stones in the emer-
gence of recognition of the rights of members of the academic community.
In striking down a resolution requiring children to salute the United States
flag,22 the Court held that the first amendment rights of both children and
their parents had been violated. 23 As in Meyer, academic freedom was not
mentioned. Instead, the Court found the flag salute to be a form of expres-
sion that the state could not prescribe without infringing on the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the first amendment.24 The Court went on to
state that boards of education do not have such absolute control over their
schools that they are immune from constitutional dictates. Respect for con-
stitutional guarantees is necessary to avoid "strangl[ing] the free mind[s]" of
school children.25 In noting that Barnette overruled a decision it had made
just three years earlier in Minersoille School District v. Gobit's,26 the Court
stated that there are circumstances in which courts can overrule decisions of
local school boards.
2 7
The next major steps in the recognition of academic freedom as a pro-
tected interest occurred in a series of cases dealing with the constitutionality
of loyalty programs. Although one of many cases dealing with loyalty pro-
grams involving public employees generally,28 Sweezy o. New Hampshire29 in-
dicated that there are special considerations when an alleged constitutional
violation involves a teacher. The Court termed the need for freedom in the
university community "essential" and stated that "[t]eachers and students
19. Id. at 400-02.
20. Id. at 402.
21. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. Id. at 642.
23. Id. at 630-31, 642.
24. Id. at 632-33.
25. Id. at 637.
26. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
27. 319 U.S. at 637. The power of school boards is statutory. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-
109 (1)(t)(1973) requires school boards to select textbooks. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-110(r)
(1973) permits boards to remove materials that are "immoral or pernicious." R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 16-2-16 (1969) gives local school committees the power to designate curriculum and select
texts. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 20-7-602 (1978) provides that the district superintendent or
principal is to choose books, subject to the approval of school trustees. MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 20-7-111 (1978) allows a state board to specify the "basic instructional program," with
local boards of trustees empowered to approve "other instruction."
28. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). For other cases involving teach-
ers and loyalty programs, see, e.g., Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See
generalo Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of The Oath?, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 193.
29. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). For a discussion of Sweezy and the application of the case to
elementary and secondary teachers, see Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to
Teach, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1183-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Teach).
1980]
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must always remain free to inquire, to study and evaluate, to gain new ma-
turity and understanding . .. 30
An issue similar to the one in Sweezy was involved in a case decided
three years later in Shelton v. Tucker.3 I The plaintiff was a public school
teacher 32 who challenged the constitutionality of a state law requiring dis-
closure by teachers of all organizations to which they had belonged or con-
tributed within five years of filing an annual affadavit. 33 The Court found
that protection of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms was "nowhere more
vital [than] in the community of American schools."'34 However, while rec-
ognizing that freedom of association was particularly important in the aca-
demic setting, the Court reaffirmed its holdings in two earlier cases in which
it had found that the state has a strong interest in insuring that teachers are
competent.
35
A third case involving a teacher who objected to a loyalty program was
Kqtsh'an v. Board of Regents,36 in which the Court overturned 37 a New York
law that disqualified from employment anyone who joined a group advocat-
ing the overthrow of government by force.38 The Court stated that the
country was deeply committed to protecting academic freedom. The first
amendment did not allow laws "that cast a pall of orthodoxy" over the class-
room, which the Court found to be "peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas.' "39 The Court went on to state that the country's future depends on
providing young people a wide exposure to a variety of concepts, rather than
limiting students to the ideas only of those in authority. 4°
The year after Keiysh'an, the Court had an opportunity to deal with a
controversy involving curriculum. Epperson v. Arkansas4 1 was a challenge to
an anti-evolution statute that prohibited teaching of the theory of evolu-
30. 354 U.S. at 250.
31. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
32. Id. at 482.
33. Id. at 480.
34. Id. at 487.
35. Id. at 485 (citing Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) and Beilan v. Bd. of
Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958)). In Adler, the Court upheld a New York law disqualifying
teachers who belonged to subversive organizations that were included in a list made by the state
board of regents. 342 U.S. at 493. In Beilan, the Court upheld the removal of a teacher who
had refused to answer questions about communist activities. 357 U.S. at 409. The teacher's
discharge, however, was based on incompetency and insubordination, not on loyalty grounds.
357 U.S. at 406.
While Sweezy, She/ton, Adler and Beilan all involved teachers, the cases primarily dealt with
loyalty programs, which involved the issue of freedom of association. See J. NOWAK, R. RO-
TUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794-801 (1978).
36. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
37. Id. at 609-10.
38. Id. at 593.
39. Id. at 603. The origin of the term "marketplace of ideas" was not indicated in Ktyi-
shan. It was first coined after a Supreme Court decision by Justice Holmes, dissenting in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). The theory did not originate with Holmes.
See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 11 (1859).
40. 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
41. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). For a discussion of Epperson from the point of view of an author
who disagrees with the rationale of the case, see Pubic School Teachers, supra note 14, at 1309-16.
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tion.42 The Court found the law unconstitutional because it was a violation
of the first amendment prohibitions on establishment of religion or on denial
of the free exercise of religion. Although it based its decision on the religious
dictates of the first amendment, the Court found that the state was not free
to impose on teachers conditions restrictive of their first amendment free-
doms. 43 The Court indicated that it would not hesitate to intervene when
the state imposed arbitrary restrictions "upon the freedom of teachers to
teach and of students to learn."
4 4
While the Court indicated that teachers and students are entitled to
constitutional protections, it cautioned, however, that the decision was not
an attempt to deal with "the multitude of controversies that beset our cam-
puses today."'45 Instead, Epperson resolved the issue of the teaching ban
within the narrow confines of the first amendment's religious freedom guar-
antees. 46 The Court also stated that, for the most part, public education is
to be controlled by state and local authorities. Courts will not intervene in
conflicts arising in schools when the issues involved do not sharply implicate
basic constitutional values.
4 7
In a separate concurrence, Justice Black indicated that he was more
adamant than the majority in his belief that the control of education was
almost wholly within the power of the states. Schools should be free to
choose their own curricula so long as such action "does not palpably conflict
with a clear constitutional command." He could find no reason a state
would be prohibited from "withdraw[ing] from its curriculum any subject
deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools." Instead of
basing the decision on religious freedom, Justice Black stated he would have
struck down the Arkansas statute on vagueness grounds.
48
In a portion of the concurrence quoted verbatim in Cagy,49 Justice Black
stated that it was questionable whether academic freedom would permit a
teacher to breach his contract by straying from the subjects approved by
school officials. 50 Furthermore, he expressed doubts about the wisdom of the
Supreme Court supervising and censoring the curricula of schools "in every
hamlet and city in the United States."
'5 '
Justice Stewart, concurring in Epperson, emphatically asserted that
states are free to designate school curricula.5 2 Stewart, who also was quoted
42. 393 U.S. at 98. An anti-evolution statute was the issue in a famous early twentieth
century case, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), which has generated a great
deal of literature, both legal and nonlegal. See note I supra. See also Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws
and the Public Schools. A Second Connumption?, 27 VAND. L. REv. 209 (1974) and Right to Teach,
supra note 29, at 1176. Nonlegal literature includes L. ALLEN, BRYAN AND DARROW AT DAY-
TON (1967) and J. LAWRENCE & R. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955).
43. 393 U.S. at 103-07 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, 605-606).
44. 393 U.S. at 105 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390).
45. 393 U.S. at 105-06.
46. Id. at 103.
47. Id. at 104.
48. Id. at 112-13.
49. 598 F.2d at 540.
50. 393 U.S. at 113-14.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id. at 115.
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
in the Car decision, based his concurrence on the rationale that a state could
not constitutionally forbid a teacher to mention the theory of evolution.
However, he stated that the state is free to mandate that particular subjects
be excluded. For example, the state could dictate that Spanish would be the
only foreign language taught, but could not constitutionally punish a
teacher for informing the students that other languages are spoken.
5 3
The rights of both teachers and students were addressed by the Court a
few months after the Epperson decision in Tinker v. Des Moines School Ditlrt,
5 4
in which the Court found that the plaintiffs, public school students, could
not be suspended for wearing armbands because their conduct was protected
by the free speech clause of the first amendment.55 But while the Court
found that students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"' 56 it reaffirmed its
earlier holding that state and school officials have wide discretion in running
the schools. 57 This authority will yield only when there is a clear indication
of danger, and it is not enough for school authorities merely to show that
suppression of expression is grounded on a wish to avoid "discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 58
The Court went on to state that, while officials may avoid material dis-
ruptions, the schools are not "enclaves of totalitarianism" in which the stu-
dents may be regarded as "closed-circuit recipients" of only the ideas the
authorities think appropriate. 59 Among the purposes of a school is commu-
nication among students, 6° an indication that students have the right to re-
ceive information, as well as the right to express their own ideas.
In a dissent cited in the Caqy decision, 6 1 Justice Black stated that a
teacher does not have a "complete right" to free expression when instructing
elementary and high school students. 62 Black again 63 found that teachers
are hired to teach a specified curriculum, and are obligated to adhere to it.
6 4
Justice Stewart, in a separate concurrence, indicated that children do
not have first amendment rights equal to those of adults. Analogizing a
child to "someone in a captive audience," Justice Stewart indicated a child's
individual choice, in some circumstances, would be less than that of an
adult.
65
Tinker was the last of the major extensions of a general right of aca-
demic freedom. Although the Burger Court has had the opportunity to ad-
53. Id. at 115-116.
54. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a discussion of Thker, see Miller, Teachers'Freedom of Expression
Wtuht'n the Classroom- .4 Search for Standards, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 849-56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Standards].
55. 393 U.S. at 505-06.
56. Id. at 506.
57. Id. at 507.
58. Id. at 509.
59. Id. at 511.
60. Id. at 512.
61. 598 F.2d at 540.
62. 393 U.S. at 521.
63. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
64. 393 U.S. at 522.
65. Id. at 515.
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dress the issue of academic freedom, it has declined to do so. 66 In fact, the
Burger Court only once has used the phrase "academic freedom" in its opin-
ions dealing with educational issues.
6 7
In San Antonio Independent School Distn'ct v. Rodr'guez,6' the Court found
there was no constitutional infirmity69 in a state education financing plan in
which there were wide disparities between local districts in expenditures.
70
Texas' aid to education plan had been attacked on the grounds that it dis-
criminated on the basis of wealth. 7 ' While stating that education is proba-
bly the most important function of local government, 72 the Court held that
there is no constitutional right to an education. 73 "[T]he undisputed impor-
tance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation.
'74
In Healy v. James,75 petitioners were college students who claimed their
first amendment rights of freedom of expression and association were vio-
lated when the president of the school refused to grant official recognition to
a chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society. 76 While reaffirming
some of the major themes of its previous decisions recognizing the rights of
members of the academic community, 77 the Court was unwilling to find that
the students had a right to official campus recognition. 78 Instead, the case
was remanded for a determination of whether or not the petitioners would
abide by reasonable campus regulations.
79
While the Court in Healy stated that institutions of higher education are
not immune from the first amendment, it also reiterated the position it had
taken in Tinker, that school authorities have great authority in controlling
conduct of students.80 The Court relied on Shelton in finding that a college is
a particularly appropriate place for a free interchange of ideas, and stated it
was not a new idea that the country is dedicated to protecting academic
freedom.
8 '
The rights of high school students were at issue in Goss v. Lopez,8 2 in
which the Court found by a 5-4 margin that due process requires school
officials to conduct informal, on-the-spot hearings before suspending stu-
66. The Burger Court denied certiorari in three academic freedom cases and affirmed
without opinion a third. All three lower court holdings curtailed academic freedom. See notes
156-59 and accompanying text thfa.
67. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
68. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. Id. at 58-59.
70. Id. at 9-17.
71. Id. at 19-20.
72. Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
73. 411 U.S. at 33.
74. Id.
75. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
76. Id. at 172-77.
77. Id. at 180-81.
78. Id. at 194.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 180 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507).
81. Id. (citing Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487).
82. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
19801
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dents for 10 days or less.8 3 While academic freedom was not mentioned, the
Court again restated its view that students do not lose their constitutional
rights by virtue of attending school. However, it tempered this recognition
of rights by finding the authority of school officials to be "very broad."
8 4
The Court noted that the lower federal courts had uniformly held the due
process clause applicable to expulsions of students from state institutions.
8 5
While Goss marked the extension of constitutional protections to high
school students, the case also can be interpreted as signalling a possible fu-
ture retreat by the Court in the area of the rights of members of the aca-
demic community. Not only was Goss a 5-4 decision, but one of the
majority was Justice Douglas, who retired later in the year. His replace-
ment, Justice Stevens, often has voted with the four Goss dissenters, Justices
Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.
8 6
To summarize, the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of academic
freedom in a variety of settings. While it has recognied that constitutional
rights apply to students and teachers, the court also, however, has stated that
control is vested primarily in the local school authorities, and particularly in
school boards. Although the Court has indicated that academic freedom
exists, it has done little to define the extent of that freedom, beyond indicat-
ing that traditional constitutional safeguards apply to members of the aca-
demic community.
In particular, the Court has not defined the limits of the state's powers
in the area of curriculum contols, which was the issue addressed in Cat,. Of
the modern Supreme Court cases recognizing the right of academic freedom,
only Epperson8 7 has dealt with the issue of how far the state may go in forbid-
ding the teaching of particular topics. And Epperson could be interpreted as
standing only for the proposition that a state, while it has road power to
control curriculum, cannot infringe on religious freedom through a law that
establishes a particular religion by promoting that religion's doctrine via its
schools.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Although the Supreme Court has defined the contours of academic free-
dom only in broad terms, many of the lower federal courts have attempted
to provide more substantive guidelines for the rights of members of the aca-
demic community.8 8 In doing so, the courts have lacked consistency. In the
83. Id. at 581.
84. Id. at 574 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
85. 419 U.S. at 576-78 n.8.
86. For cases in which Stevens has voted with the Goss dissenters, see, e.g., United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). Contra,
Houchins, Sheriff v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
87. See notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
88. Several difficulties arise in defining the parameters of academic freedom. First, the
freedom applies to several groups. See note 2 supra. In addition, there are a number of types of
cases involving issues that may be viewed as related, at least peripherally, to academic freedom:
1. Cases involving the right of school authorities to remove or ban books used in
the school library and curriculum. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
[Vol. 57:2
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area of curricular controls, in fact, there is a split in the circuits. 89
There are hundreds of federal court decisions dealing with educational
issues. Many of these involve the due process rights of students and teach-
ers.90 Those cases are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on con-
trol of curriculum and teaching methods. Within this area, two recent cases
have involved the removal of books from school libraries. Most of the con-
troversies have arisen, however, when high school teachers have been fired
for using materials deemed improper by school authorities. A third group of
opinions included in this section relates to the need for school authorities to
supply reasons for their actions, thus establishing a record for review.
A. The Pre-Academtc Freedom Cases
The curriculum cases did not arise in a vacuum. Prior to the decisions
concerning teaching materials, there were many federal court opinions deal-
ing with other issues involving school authorities and education, for exam-
Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), discussed in notes 178-79 and accompanying text
infra.
2. Curriculum content cases, including those in which teachers were discharged
for using teaching materials or methods that school authorities found to be obscene or
inappropriate. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), discussed in
notes 100-10 and accompanying text infra.
3. Discharge cases in which teachers claim procedural due process violations.
See, e.g., Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535
F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976).
4. Cases in which students have alleged that there have been due process viola-
tions in some action taken against them. See, e.g., Goss, discussed at text accompanying
notes 82-85 supra.
5. Cases in which teachers have alleged their rights to free expression and free
assembly have been violated. See, e.g., Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.
1978); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the free
speech rights of teachers when the speech involves extramural activities, see 81bic
School Teachers, supra note 12, at 1303-05. See also (by the same author) Goldstein,
Academic Freedom: Its Meaning and Underl'yng Premises as Seen Through the American Experi-
ence, 11 ISRAEL L. REV. 52 (1976).
6. Cases in which students have alleged their rights of free expression and assem-
bly have been violated. See, e.g., Tiker, discussed at text accompanying notes 54-65;
Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970). See also Abbott, Due Process and Seconda School Dismissals, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 378 (1969); Van Alstyne, Thejudicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20
U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968). A landmark case in which a court of appeals found that
an expelled student was entitled to certain rights as a matter of procedural due process
was Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961). Among the lawyers arguing the case for the plaintiffs was Thurgood Marshall,
who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1967.
7. Cases in which the method of taxation to support schools is alleged to be
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Rodriguez, discussed in text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
8. Those in which the spending of public money for parochial schools or the
children attending such schools is alleged to be a violation of the first amendment
establishment clause prohibiting the establishment of a religion. See, e.g. Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
89. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), discussed at notes 100-110 and
accompanying text itfa. In Keefe, the court found unconstitutional the firing of a teacher who
had used a "vulgar term" during a discussion of a magazine article he had assigned. 418 F.2d at
361-62. But see Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), a don rehearing en banc, 502
F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975), discussed at notes 134-45 and accom-
panying text infra.
90. See note 88 supra.
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pie, the procedural due process rights of students. 9 1 Recognition of the
rights of teachers and students, however, is relatively new. As recently as the
mid-1960s, some courts still were reluctant to recognize the constitutional
free speech rights of teachers. In a 1965 case, Parker v. Board of Education of
Prince George's County, Md ,92 the Fourth Circuit stated it need not rule on the
validity of a discharged teacher's first amendment claims because the in-
structor was a probationary teacher. 93 The plaintiff had assigned a book
included in an approved school book list, Brave New World by Aldous Hux-
ley. He was told his contract would not be renewed after a parent com-
plained about the assignment. 94 Academic freedom was not mentioned in
either the district or appeals courts' decisions.
Nor was academic freedom discussed in two cases decided the next year
by the Fifth Circuit. 95 The cases involved the wearing of freedom buttons
indicating support of the civil rights movement. 96 In one case, the wearing
of the buttons was found to be free speech protected by the first amend-
ment. 97 In the other, the circuit court held school authorities could prohibit
the wearing of the buttons where school discipline was undermined. 98 The
cases were predecessors to Tinker, and were cited extensively by the Supreme
Court in that decision three years later.99
B. The Teaching Method and Curriculum Content Cases
The existence of a teacher's academic freedom to teach was said to be
conceded by the school authorities in a First Circuit decision handed down a
few months after the Supreme Court's Tinker opinion. °° In Keefe v. Ge-
anakos,10 1 a teacher was suspended after he led a class discussion of a "dirty"
word that appeared in an Atlantic Monthly article assigned to senior English
class students. 10 2  Finding no precedent with which it agreed, the court
stated bluntly that it was not impressed with the reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit in Parker. 10 3 Since there were at least five books in the school library
containing the same word, it would be inconsistent for the school authorities
91. E.g., Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); Hammond v. S.C. State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
92. 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). For an example of a
decision in which a court held that first amendment claims must be considered, see Pred v. Bd.
of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed in notes 198-199 and accompanying
text in7fta.
93. 348 F.2d at 465.
94. 237 F.Supp. 222, 224-25 (D. Md.), a'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
95. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
96. 363 F.2d at 746; 363 F.2d at 750.
97. 363 F.2d at 747-49.
98. 363 F.2d at 754.
99. 393 U.S. at 505-13.
100. Tinker was decided in 1969. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra.
101. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969). For an extended discussion of Keefe, see Nahmod, Contro-
versy in the Classroom." The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1032, 1036-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Controversj].
102. 418 F.2d at 360-61. The word was described by the court as a "vulgar term for an
incestuous son." Id. at 361.
103. Id. at 362. Parker is discussed in text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
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to fire a teacher for discussing it in class. 1'
Further, the Keefe court noted that the word was "currently used." If
the students had to be protected from such language, the court would "fear
f6r their future." Conceding that the word would offend some parents, the
court surmised that the term was not unknown to many high school seniors.
The circuit stated that it agreed with the school authorities, however, that
obscenity standards should be variable-what would be obscene for students
would not be obscene for adults.'
0 5
While noting that school authorities have the right to regulate speech in
the classroom, 10 6 the First Circuit found the magazine article to be "schol-
arly, thoughtful and thought-provoking."'0 7 Furthermore, there would be a
chilling effect if the state were allowed to engage in such "rigorous censor-
ship."1
0 8
The Keefe court made this ground-breaking decision in the absence of
any guidelines, except for reference to opinions that the court recognized as
dealing with academic freedom generally.' 09 Nor did the circuit court try to
formulate a test to be used in the future. Instead, the appeals court evalu-
ated the material used and the discussion by the teacher of the offending
word, and virtually took judicial notice of the fact that the article and dis-
cussion were appropriate for high school seniors."t 0
In Parducci v. Rutland,"' decided a few months after Keefe,' 12 a federal
district court adopted a rationale similar to that of the First Circuit. The
teacher, whose ability was unquestioned, was fired after she refused to stop
assigning a story, "Welcome to the Monkey House," by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.,
to her junior English classes." 13 Finding that there were books on an ap-
proved list and in the school library containing language more offensive than
that used in the Vonnegut story,"14 the court relied on two Supreme Court
decisions, Roth v. United States'15 and Ginsberg," t 6 to determine whether the
104. 418 F.2d at 362-63.
105. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). In Gtnberg, the Supreme
Court found that the state is not constitutionally prohibited from applying different standards
for the sale of obscene material to minors than it does for adult sales. The Court based its
decision on the rationale that the state's authority to control minors' conduct is more extensive
than its authority over adults. Id. at 637-43.
The Gtnsberg "variable obscenity" test is based on the premise that the adults "who have
this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed
to aid discharge of that responsibility," as well as the government's interest in protecting minors.
Id. at 639-40.
106. Id. at 362.
107. Id. at 361.
108. Id. at 362.
109. d.
110. The court stated that it did not need affidavits to find the article "scholarly, thoughtful
and though-provoking." Id. at 361.
11I. 316 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ala. 1970). For an extended discussion of Parducci, see Contro-
versy, supra note 101, at 1036-41.
112. The court cited the portion of Keefe in which the First Circuit discussed the common
use of the "dirty" word involved and the fear of school authorities that parents might be of-
fended. 316 F. Supp. at 356 (citing 418 F.2d at 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969)).
113. 316 F. Supp. at 353-54. See note 169 infta.
114. Id. at 356-57.
115. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
116. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See note 105 supra. For a discussion of the applicability of the
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story was obscene.' 17
In addition to the obscene nature of the material, the court considered
the appropriateness of the story for students who were high school juniors. It
also relied heavily on evidence that the assignment had not threatened or
caused disruption of the educational process.' 18 The court did not explicitly
state that it was formulating a three-pronged test consisting of the material's
appropriateness, its obscene nature, and interference with school discipline.
The rationale came closer, however, to formulating a test for evaluating cur-
riculum controversies than did most of the other opinions dealing with simi-
lar issues.
Although the Parducci court indicated that teachers should be given lati-
tude in choosing teaching materials, it based its holding in part on the un-
fairness of discharging a teacher for conduct not previously prohibited by
school authorities. The court also noted that it was not commenting "upon
the advisability of requiring school administrators to promulgate rules and
regulations .... ,1,i9 These comments indicate that the court would have
found that school officials have the authority to promulgate rules governing
teaching materials.
The most extensive effort by any federal court to devise guidelines for
resolving curriculum disputes was attempted by a federal district court in
Mailloux v. Key. 120 The district court's test for evaluating the acceptability
of teaching materials was not affirmed on appeal, even though the First Cir-
cuit did uphold the portion of the trial court's opinion finding the firing of a
teacher impermissible on the ground that rules governing teacher conduct
were too vague.
12 1
The plaintiff in Mailoux had written the word "fuck" on the blackboard
during a discussion of a novel in his English class of high school juniors. The
word was not used in the novel, nor was it spoken during the class. There
was an unsupported allegation that the teacher had asked a girl to define the
word. There were no school regulations governing the use of such words.
Experts testified the word was relevant and served an educational purpose,
but school authorities testified to the contrary. The trial court found that,
under the circumstances, the word was not inappropriate.
22
Relying on Keefe and Parducci, the district court found that a public
school teacher not only has a right to freedom of speech inside and outside of
the classroom, but also a measure of academic freedom in his classroom
teaching. ' 2 3 The court defined the issue as whether a secondary teacher had
a right to choose a method that was not necessary, not shown by the weight
Ginsberg obscenity test to the classroom setting, see Controversy, supra note 101, at 1050-53.
117. 316 F. Supp. at 355-56.
118. Id. at 356.
119. Id at 356-57.
120. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), a'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d at 1242 (Ist Cir. 1971). For
a discussion of Matloux, see Public School Teachers, supra note 12, at 1324-31.
121. 448 F.2d at 1243. The case was before the First Circuit twice. See note 127 infra.
122. 323 F. Supp. at 1387-90.
123. Id. at 1390.
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of opinion as permissible, and not obviously proper, but was relevant, and in
the opinion of experts served a serious educational purpose. The court found
that this qualified right was the central tenant of academic freedom.124 The
court limited its holding, however, by finding that when a teacher uses such
a method, he may be fired if he has been given advance notice that the
method is prohibited.'
25
The court also distinguished the rights of secondary teachers from those
of college professors. Not only is a secondary teacher less skilled, but he is
hired to concentrate on "transmitting basic knowledge" and is expected to
indoctrinate students in the mores of society, the court held. While high
schools are not inflexible, neither are they "open forums" for the exchange of
ideas. 126
In affirming the decision on the vagueness grounds, the First Circuit
stated in a brief opinion that, while the district court's effort to formulate
guidelines was "sensitive," this test would cause more problems than it
would solve. The circuit could find no substitute for "a case-by-case inquiry
into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably suf-
ficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech."'
127
Curriculum was only one of several issues presented in the first of two
cases considered by the Seventh Circuit, Clark v. Holmes,' 28 which involved
the firing of a temporary, nontenured university teacher. The plaintiff had
been warned that he counselled too many students, overemphasized sex in
health classes, 129 counselled students with his door shut, and criticized other
faculty members in discussions with students. His superiors had disapproved
of all of these practices. The court found for the university, primarily on the
ground that the state has wide discretion in deciding whom to employ as a
teacher.1
3 0
In discussing the curriculum issue, the court found that academic free-
dom is not "a license for uncontrolled expression at variance" with estab-
lished curriculum. 131 The circuit also distinguished the teacher's comments
from those made by public employees speaking as citizens, rather than in
their roles as government workers. 132 Further, the court found that a
124. Id. at 1392.
125. Id.
126. 323 F.2d at 1392.
127. 448 F.2d at 1243. The case was before the First Circuit for the second time, having
been dismissed without prejudice earlier in the year. 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971). The first
appeal was brought by school authorities, who were unsuccessful in an attempt to obtain a stay
of the district court's preliminary injunction requiring that the plaintiff be returned to work
pending trial. In upholding the district court's issuance of the stay order, the circuit indicated
that factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of teaching materials include
the age and sophistication of students, relevance of the educational purpose, and context and
manner of presentation. 436 F.2d at 566.
128. 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. dented, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
129. The overemphasis on sex in the teacher's health course was the only curricular issue in
the case.
130. 474 F.2d at 929-31.
131. Id. at 931.
132. Id. at 931-32. The Seventh Circuit distinguished several cases on the ground that they
involved teachers who were fired for speaking about public issues. In particular, the court
found the fact pattern in Clark to be distinguishable from that in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
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teacher may be limited in what he teaches by the need to maintain discipline
in the classroom, by a need for confidentiality between the teacher and other
members of the faculty, or because the teacher's conduct interferes with his
duty to teach.
33
In the second of the two Seventh Circuit opinions, Brubaker V. Board of
Education,' 34 the court upheld the discharge of three eighth grade teachers
on the ground they had distributed "obscene and improper" materials to
students. The teachers had distributed brochures about a documentary
movie depicting Woodstock, a 1969 rock music festival. There were refer-
ences in the brochure to drugs, sex, and what the court called "vulgari-
ties."1
3 5
Two of the teachers claimed that the brochure was relevant to the sub-
jects they taught. The class of one of the plaintiffs, who taught language
arts, had been studying the history of rock music. 136 Another appellant
taught industrial arts and said the brochure contributed to the students' in-
terest in constructing musical instruments. The third teacher made no
claims about the relevancy of the material. She did not, however, distribute
the brochure directly to the students. Instead, she gave it to the other two
plaintiffs, placed some copies in the teachers' lounge, and displayed a poster
from the brochure in her classroom.1
37
The circuit quoted extensively from the testimony of two "eminently
educated" experts who found the materials to be both relevant and appro-
priate.' 38 It also found that a member of the staff of the state Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction was qualified to testify as an expert. The staff
member stated that the brochure, which had no educational value, was in-
appropriate for elementary school students.' 39 After excerpting from the ex-
perts' testimony at length, the court indicated that there was no need for
expert testimony, since the controverted material was in evidence. 140
Although the court did not indicate what test it was using or even state
explicitly that it had found the material to be obscene with respect to junior
high students, the opinion clearly indicated that the court was shocked. In
addition to terming the material "vulgar," the court asked: "It is probably a
fair inference that by second or third year high school (sic) most American
U.S. 563 (1968), in which the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional to fire a teacher who
had written a letter to a newspaper criticizing the school board. The Court found that the state
did not have any significantly greater interest in regulating its employees' speech than in regu-
lating the expression of other citizens when the speech was comment on public issues. 391 U.S.
at 568.
133. 474 F.2d at 931. The Seventh Circuit stated that the legitimate state interests that
could be used as a basis for limiting a teacher's speech were suggested by tckering, discussed in
note 132 supra.
134. 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), aj'd on rehearing en bane, 502 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denzed, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
135. 502 F.2d at 975-76.
136. The court appeared to be puzzled as to the reason rock music history was a topic
studied in a language arts class. "We are not advised what rock music has to do with Language
Arts .... " Id. at 978.
137. Id. at 977-78.
138. Id. at 980-81.
139. Id. at 982.
140. Id at 984.
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males have become familiar with, and at times employ, these and like words.
Is it only a forlorn hope, however, that most of our young ladies will never
employ that kind of speech?" 14' The court also indicated it thought the
teachers should have expressed "regret" over the matter.' 42
In a dissent, Judge Fairchild stated that the brochure was not obscene.
Noting that "[t]he use of profanity does not tranform the controversial into
the obscene," he found that academic freedom gives a teacher some latitude
in selecting material. He also commented that the appropriateness of a dis-
cussion topic could not be judged solely by the topic of the course. A success-
ful teacher may relate to his students through a philosophical discussion,
since "academic freedom is the exchange of ideas which promote education
in its broadest sense."
14 3
The difficulty with the Brubaker opinion is that the Seventh Circuit gave
no reasons for upholding the discharge, other than the clear indication that
the judges were shocked. Although the court devoted extensive space to ex-
cerpts from the testimony of the experts who supported the use of the
brochure, it did not state why the experts' opinions were disregarded. The
opinion is mostly a recitation of the facts 144 with almost no rationale. The
court excuses this failure on the ground that its conclusion "emerges so
clearly that we decline to add . . . to the already abundant literature on the
subject . . . ." Just where the court found such a wealth of material on the
subject is a mystery, since the opinion cited only one other curriculum case,
AMai/loux. 145
The teaching of a controversial unit on race relations and other topics
led to the firing of a high school teacher of civics and political science in
Sterzt'ng v. Fort Bend Independent School Dzstrct..146 In finding that the Texas
teacher's rights had been violated, the district court stated that a teacher
must be able to adapt his course to modern times. While there may be some
limits placed on a teacher's methods, he should not have to risk dismissal for
including controversial issues in his curriculum. In what is the strongest of
any statement of the right of a teacher to designate course content, the court
said that "[a] responsible teacher must have freedom to use the tools of his
141. Id. at 976. The court also stated that the poetry in the brochure could be interpreted
as a "beckoning" for students to "throw off the dull discipline imposed on them by the moral
environment of their home life, and in exchange to enter into a new world of love and freedom
...to take their clothes off and to get an early start in the use of ... vulgarities ....
Among the words that appeared to shock the court were "shit" and "fucking." Id.
142. Id. at 982.
143. Id. at 991-92.
144. Id. at 983. The court indicated it was supplying such detailed factual background to
"expose the correctness" of its decision.
145. Id. at 984-85 (citing Malloux, 436 F.2d at 566, 448 F.2d at 1243, discussed at notes 120-
27 and accompanying text supra).
146. 376 F. Supp. 657, 658-60 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated and remanded, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1974). The appeal was brought solely on the ground that the district judge, while awarding
monetary damages, had denied reinstatement of the teacher. The Fifth Circuit remanded for
reconsideration of the remedy, finding that it was impermissible for the trial court to consider
that reinstatement would be "too antagonistic." While not ordering reinstatement, the court of
appeals commented: "Enforcement of constitutional rights frequently has disturbing conse-




profession as he sees fit." The court termed such freedom of choice a sub-
stantive right. 1
47
The Serzing court placed on the school authorities the burden of mak-
ing sure that sensitive subjects are handled properly. The court suggested
that a school district, rather than manacling its teachers because it fears con-
troversial subjects will be treated improperly, should hire instructors who are
capable of teaching responsibly. It also indicated that it was relying on
favorable expert opinion concerning the acceptability of the materials, the
fact there was shown to be an educational purpose, and the procedural right
of a teacher to use a method not prohibited by school regulations. Although
indicating that its holding was based in part on the fact the teaching method
was not proscribed, the court seemed to imply that a school district would
not have the right to forbid the teaching of topics "within the ambit of ac-
cepted professional standards."'
148
A statutorily imposed curriculum control was unsuccessfully challenged
in Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education, 149 in which a three-judge district
court panel upheld a law prohibiting the discussion of birth control in public
schools. '50 While finding that a teacher had the right to raise the issue of the
constitutionality of the law on his own behalf, the panel held that he did not
have standing to assert students' rights to learn about birth control.1 '
In a strongly worded opinion, the court, while stating that the right of
the state is not absolute,' 52 found that the first amendment does not give a
teacher a right to instruct "beyond the scope of the established curriculum."
It is perfectly proper, the panel held, for the state to establish a. curriculum
either by law, as it did in the birth control statute, or by delegating the
responsibility to local school boards.1
53
Parents who do not agree with the state's choice of curriculum have the
choice of sending their children to private schools, the Mercer court reasoned.
In addition, the banned information could be "left for grasping from other
sources, such as the family, peers or other institutions."' 54 The court seemed
to imply that, because the information was available elsewhere, it was not
unconstitutional for the state to prohibit its teaching, a justification that ap-
pears to be contrary to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the area of
restraints on expression.'
55
But perhaps the most significant aspect of the Mercer case is its affirm-
147. 376 F. Supp. at 661-62.
148. Id. at 662. In addition to the academic freedom ground, the court based its holding on
procedural due process grounds, since the teacher was not given notice of the charges against
him or a chance to rebut them. Id. at 660. The court also chided the school authorities for not
learning firsthand about the teaching methods involved, indicating that instead the court had
relied on "hearsay remarks." Id. at 661.
149. 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), afd, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
150. Id. at 582, 587.
151. Id. at 584.
152. Id. at 585 (citing Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107, discussed in notes 41-53 and accompanying
text supra).
153. 379 F. Supp. at 585.
154. Id. at 586.
155. Eg., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n. 4 (1974); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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ance by the Burger Court. 156 Although upheld without opinion, Mercer is
the only one of the lower court decisions dealing with curriculum controls
that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied by the
Court in three other curriculum decisions that were clearly restrictive of aca-
demic freedom, Brubaker, 15 7 Presidents Council, Distrit 25 v. Community School
Board No. 25,158 and Clark . Holmes.' 59
A teaching method was at issue in Wilson v. Chancellor,'6° in which a
district court found that the right of academic freedom encompasses the de-
cision of high school teachers to use outside speakers. Wilson is unusual
among the cases considering teaching methods because there had been no
teacher discharge. The court held that, even in the absence of actual or
threatened loss of employment, proscriptions on teaching methods impliedly
indicate a threat of sanction, thereby restricting the teacher's freedom of ex-
pression. 161
Noting that few courts had considered the extent to which academic
freedom is protected by the first amendment, the opinion stated that secon-
dary school teachers are to be accorded less free rein than university profes-
sors. It based this difference on the assumption that professors are involved
on a quest for knowledge, while secondary teachers merely disseminate infor-
mation.1 6 2 Furthermore, the court found school boards should be allowed
wide discretion in making decisions. A court should not intervene merely on
the basis that the school board's decision appears unwise. If the board has
violated someone's constitutional rights, however, then courts are required to
intervene. 
16 3
C. The Book Banni'ng Cases
During the same year that the Seventh Circuit decided that it was per-
missible to fire a college teacher for including too much about sex in his
health classes, the Second Circuit put its stamp of approval on the removal
of books from junior high school libraries in Presidents Council, District 25 V.
Communty School Board No. 25.164 The case is similar to both Cay and Wilson
in that no teacher was fired. Instead, the plaintiff was an organization of
presidents and past presidents of parent and parent-teacher groups, three
students, seven additional parents, two teachers, a librarian and a princi-
pal.16 5 The action was brought after the school board voted to remove a
156. 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
157. Discussed in notes 134-145 and accompanying text supra.
158. Discussed in notes 164-177 and accompanying text infra.
159. Discussed in notes 128-33 and accompanying text supra.
160. 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976). Attorneys fees were awarded to the plaintiffs, a stu-
dent and a teacher, in a subsequent opinion. 425 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (D. Or. 1977).
161. 418 F. Supp. at 1361-63.
162. Se Pubh& School Teachers, note 12 supra.
163. 418 F. Supp. at 1362.
164. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), ceri. dened, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
165. This alliance of plaintiffs was the most inclusive of any plaintiff group in any of the
cases presented in this paper. The opponents of the book ban undoubtedly thought their
chances of success would be heightened if all segments of the community were represented. If,
for example, parents' rights were not found to be violated, those of teachers or students might
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book containing obscenities and sex. 166
The circuit, quoting from the portion of Epperson that indicated courts
should not interfere in the day-to-day operations of schools,1 6 7 found there
had been nothing more than a "miniscule" infringement on the constitu-
tional rights of any of the plaintiffs,1 68 however, it did not discuss the sepa-
rate rights of each of the groups involved. Instead, the circuit reasoned that
some authority has to select the books for school libraries. The court was
unconvinced by any claim of constitutional violations: "shouts of book
burning, witch hunting and violation of academic freedom" did not elevate
an issue involving daily operation of schools to a controversy of constitu-
tional level. The circuit stated that the infringement would have to be much
more severe to excuse "the intrusions of three or even nine federal jurists
making curriculum or library choices for the community of scholars."'
169
The court did not indicate what would constitute an infringement of suffi-
cient magnitude.
The court was equally unmoved by the plaintiffs' argument that the
initial selection or rejection of a book was different from removing volumes
from the shelves:
This concept of a book acquiring tenure by shelving is indeed novel
and unsupportable under any theory of constitutional law we can
discover. It would seem clear to us that books which become obso-
lete or irrelevant or where improperly selected initally, for
whatever reason, can be removed by the same authority which was
empowered to make the selection in the first place.17
0
Keefe' y ' and Parducci*'72 were distinguished on the ground that they in-
volved the discharge of teachers, and therefore presented due process consid-
erations. Further, the Presidents Council court clearly stated that it was
disagreeing with the holdings in those two cases to the extent that the courts
had found that first amendment rights are violated when a court disagrees
with school authorities about the material assigned by a teacher.
173
In a lone dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 174 Justice
Douglas indicated he would find that the school authorities had violated the
first amendment rights of school children "to hear, to learn, to know." Not-
ing that academic freedom had been upheld against various attacks, 175 Jus-
be. However, the Second Circuit did not address the rights of each group separately. 457 F.2d
289.
166. 457 F.2d at 290. The book was DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas.
167. 393 U.S. at 104. The circuit quoted the portion of the opinion stating that courts
cannot intervene in local school affairs unless constitutional rights are sharply implicated. 457
F.2d at 291.
168. 457 F.2d at 290-92.
169. Id. at 292. For a discussion of the role of the courts in resolving controversies in the
schools, see Rzght to Teach, supra note 29, at 1194-99.
170. 457 F.2d at 293.
171. See notes 101-10 and accompanying text supra.
172. Se notes 111-119 and accompanying text supra.
173. 457 F.2d at 293-94.
174. 409 U.S. 998 (1975).
175. Id. at 999 (citing Kqishian, 385 U.S. 589; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952);




tice Douglas implied that it was improper for a school board to make such a
decision on the basis that its own "sensibilities" had been offended. He
thought the purposes of education should include eliminating prejudices and
teaching children to solve the world's problems. Further, he stated that, un-
der Tker,17 6 such restrictions on first amendment rights should be invoked
only when there were disciplinary problems. 1
77
The Sixth Circuit, deciding an almost identical issue, held in Minarcini'v.
Strongsoille Czty School District 178 that the first amendment rights of teachers
and students had been violated' 79 by the removal of books from the library
and a ban on further teaching or shelving of the books. The outlawed novels
were Catch 22 by Joseph Heller, God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater by Kurt Von-
negut, and Cat's Cradle, also by Vonnegut. 8 0 The district court found for
the defendants, based on Presidents Council. The Sixth Circuit found that the
holding in Presidents Council'81 was not broad enough to allow the school
board "to destroy" books "without concern for the first amendment." Fur-
thermore, the court stated it would not follow Presidents Council if its holding
were that broad.' 8 2 The removal of books from a library is a much more
serious restraint on academic freedom that the armband wearing that was
constitutionally protected in Tinker, the court found. Neither the school
board nor the state of Ohio could place conditions on library use "related
solely to the social or political tastes of school board members."' 8 3 In the
absence of an explanation, the court assumed the books were removed be-
cause board members found the content objectionable, and because the
board assumed it had censorship power.' 8 4 The circuit found that the privi-
lege of using a school library was not subject to the whims of school boards
who want to eliminate books on the basis of content. However, it indicated
that a school board could, without violating constitutional rights, stop stock-
ing a book that had worn out or was obsolete, or because of limited shelf
space.' 
8 5
Although the rationale in Minarcini clearly supports a broad right of
176. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the application of the
Tinker test to classroom activities, see Conrover, supra note 101, at 1038-41.
177. 409 U.S. at 999.
178. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
179. Id. at 581-82. Although the opinion addressed the rights of both students and teachers,
the plaintiffs did not include any teachers. The suit was a class action brought on behalf of five
students. Id. at 579.
For other cases in which the rights of students to receive information was at issue, see, e.g.,
Shanhy v. NE Independent SchoolDist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Bayer v. Kinzier, 383 F. Supp.
1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975), in which courts held school officials
could not restrain distribution of student newspapers containing birth control information. Con-
tra, Trachiman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1977).
180. 541 F.2d at 579. Vonnegut's works appear to have a propensity to shock local school
boards. Use of a story by Vonnegut led to the plaintiff's discharge in Parducci, discussed at notes
111-19 and accompanying text supra.
181. 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
182. 541 F.2d at 581 (quoting 457 F.2d at 293).
183. 541 F.2d at 582 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. Compare the assumption of the Tenth Circuit in Cag, in which the court assumed
that, in the absence of reasons, the book ban would be presumed to be based on permissible
grounds. 598 F.2d at 537, 544.
185. 541 F.2d at 581.
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academic freedom, that freedom is not without limits. The court stated that
the school faculty could not make its textbook choices prevail over the selec-
tions of the school board, which was empowered under Ohio law to choose
textbooks.1 8 6 The limiting language is somewhat contradictory, considering
the court's strong stand on teachers' rights elsewhere in the opinion.
In fashioning a remedy, the court ordered the school board to invalidate
resolutions that would have prohibited discussion of the books or use of the
works as supplemental reading.' 8 7 It also ordered the board to replace the
banned volumes, using the first money available.'
88
D. Academic Freedom Cases Indicating a Need for a Record
Some of the opinions discussed previously in which curriculum content
and book banning were at issue indicated a need for the school board to state
its reasons or to rely on articulated standards in taking action relating to
selection or proscription of materials. In Parducci, the district court was con-
cerned with a "total absence of standards."' 89 The situation that resulted in
the discharge of the plaintiff illustrates "how easily arbitrary discrimination
can occur when public officials are given unfettered discretion to decide
what books should be taught and what books should be banned," the court
stated. 19
In Minarcini, the Sixth Circuit found that, since books were banned in
the absence of reasons "neutral in first amendment terms," the court should
assume the board had acted as a censor, outlawing the volumes on the basis
of content.' 9 ' In fact, as in Cag,1 9 2 the only explanation given for the
Mi'narcini book ban was a negative minority report of a textbook committee.
The secretary for the Minarcini committee had indicated one of the contro-
versial books was "garbage."' 193 No explanation was given at all by the
board itself when it banned the books. 194
The Wilson court found that school authorities must have established
standards before imposing a prior restraint. 19 5 Wilson involved the banning
of political speakers by school officials.' 96 The court found that the invalid-
ity of such prior restraints is strongly presumed. '
97
The need for a board to furnish reasons for not rehiring teachers who
have first amendment claims also has been established. For example, in Pred
v. Board of Public Instruction,198 the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim that school
authorities could simply let a teacher's contract expire without supplying
186. Id. at 579-80.
187. Id. at 584.
188. Id. at 584.
189. 316 F. Supp. at 357, discussed in notes 111-19 and accompanying text supra.
190. 316 F. Supp. at 358.
191. 541 F.2d at 582, discussed in notes 167-77 and accompanying text supra.
192. 598 F.2d at 537, 427 F. Supp. at 947-48. Se text accompanying notes 256-63 in a.
193. 541 F.2d at 581.
194. Id. at 580-81.
195. 418 F. Supp. at 1364, discussed in text accompanying notes 160-63 supra.
196. 418 F. Supp. at 1361.
197. Id. at 1364.
198. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
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reasons when a first amendment claim was involved. 199
These cases are cited as illustrative of the principle that, in the area of
academic freedom, as well as in other areas of the law, courts usually expect
to find that reasons have been supplied to justify official action. This princi-
ple is probably most firmly established in the area of administrative law.2° °
However, it is not inapplicable to Cag,, since under Colorado law, rules ap-
plying to agencies appear to be applicable to local school boards.
2 0'
E. Summag,
There is a split among the circuits in the curriculum content and book
banning cases. The First Circuit, in Mailloux and Keefe, the two cases involv-
ing "dirty words" has taken a position protective of academic teachers'
rights, as did the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini, the book banning case. The
Seventh Circuit, in Holmes, the sex counseling case, and Brubaker, in which
teachers had distributed the Woodstock brochure, has shown an unwilling-
ness to find first amendment violations in the actions of school authorities.
The Sixth Circuit, in Presidents Council, the case in which a book ban was
upheld, also has shown a readiness to reject constitutional claims. The split
is particularly noticable in the area of book bans, in which the Sixth and
First Circuits came to the opposite conclusions in deciding almost identical
issues.
Among the four federal district courts that have considered these issues,
one has taken a strong position that the state may make almost any choices it
wishes in restricting curriculum. The other three have placed some constitu-
tional limitations on the state's power.
The courts that have considered the need for findings have indicated
that, where first amendment claims are raised, a school board should supply
reasons to justify its action.
199. Id. at 855-59. For a discussion of the procedural due process rights afforded to dis-
charged teachers, see Teachers Rights, supra note 1, at 858-74.
200. See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); SEC v. Che-
nery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944); Chicago v.
FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972); Medical Com. for Human
Rts v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971), dismissedas moot, 404
U.S. 403 (1972); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
613 (1938).
201. COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-32-109 (1)(r) (1973) requires a local board to comply with
Article 4 of Title 24 of COLO. REV. STAT., which is the Administrative Procedure Act. CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 24-4-102 (3) (1973) defines an agency as any board, bureau, commission, depart-
ment, institution, division, section, or officer of the state. The definition, while specifically ex-
cluding some entities, does not mention school boards. In addition, the Colorado Supreme
Court treated a local school board as an agency in Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County
School Dist., 191 Colo. 411, 553 P.2d 793 (1976).






All of the books banned in Caqy202 were optional reading materials used
in elective courses for high school juniors and seniors. The courses were Con-
temporary Literature, Contemporary Poetry, and American Masters. Pursu-
ant to a policy adopted the previous year, a textbook evaluation committee
was formed to make recommendations to the school board. 20 3 The commit-
tee was composed of school district employees, including teachers, parents,
and students.2 ° 4 The year the books were banned was the first year the com-
mittee had operated. Previously, the school board had no policy regarding
review of teaching materials, 20 5 although Colorado law required school
boards to select textbooks. 20 6 The prior procedure was for language arts
coordinators to review and approve book purchase requests made by teach-
ers.
2 0 7
A majority of the committee recommended that 1,285 books be ap-
proved by the board. A minority report listed ten books that the dissenting
committee members believed should be rejected. Six of the ten singled out
by the minority were among the books outlawed by the school board.
20 8
Nine of the banned books had been used in courses for at least three years.
The tenth book had been in use for two years.20 9 The parties to the lawsuit
stipulated that the board's action meant that teachers could be dismissed for
insubordination for adding the books to their course reading lists, assigning
the books to students, giving students credit for reading them, reading the
volumes aloud or causing them to be read aloud, or discussing the works at
"such length as to amount to a constructive assignment of the materials. ' 210
Permitted activities were commenting on the books, recommending them to
students, and discussing the works with students outside of class. 21 1 The
board did not order that the books be removed from school libraries.
2 12
There was no obscenity issue in the case: The five plaintiff-teachers and
the defendant school board2 13 agreed that the works were not obscene.
2 14
202. See note 7 supra for a listing of the banned works.
203. 598 F.2d at 537, 427 F. Supp. at 945.
204. There is some confusion about the membership of the committee. The district court
opinion states that students, parents, and school board members were on the panel. 427 F.
Supp. at 947. The court of appeals decision states that the membership included teachers,
administrators, parents, and students. 598 F.2d at 537. The brief of the defendants states that
the committee was composed of teachers, parents, and students. Brief for Defendants-Appellees
and Cross-Appellants at 3, 598 F.2d 535 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief].
205. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants at 7, 598 F.2d 535 [herein-
after cited as Defendants' Reply Brief).
206. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109 (1)(t) (1973). CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-110 (l)(r)
(1973) permits school boards to remove materials that are "immoral or pernicious." See note 27
sup ra.
207. Defendants Reply Brief at 7 (quoting from the record at 150-51, 427 F. Supp. 945).
208. 598 F.2d at 537.
209. Brief of Appellants and Cross-Appellees at 4, 598 F.2d 535 (citing the record at 10, 427
F. Supp. 945) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Brief).
210. 598 F.2d at 538.
211. Defendants' Reply Brief at 10.
212. 427 F. Supp. at 947.
213. The school board was named as a defendant, along with four members of the panel
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They also stipulated that the board had not made a systematic effort to ex-
clude any one system of thought or philosophy, and that it would be possible
constitutionally for a decision to be made to study the books in high school
classes. 
2 15
The book banning was not the only controversy in which the Aurora
board was involved. Three members of the board had been elected on a
"Christian slate" the previous year. 2 16 Just a few months prior to the book
banning, the school board had reviewed and revised the district's sex educa-
tion program. 2 17 Another proposal considered by the board was a motion to
support the repeal of the Colorado Equal Rights Amendment. 21" About a
year after the book banning, the board defeated a motion to require that
each school day begin with a period of silent meditation or prayer.
21 9
The general thrust of some of the board's proposals had been to estab-
lish an atmosphere in which religious concerns appeared paramount. In
fact, one member of the board indicated that his religious convictions were
of prime importance in all his decisions. Another stated that, while his reli-
gious beliefs governed everything he did, he was not attempting to force
them on others. 2 2 0 However, the issue of whether the board's actions in ban-
ning the books constituted an establishment of a particular religion in viola-
tion of the first amendment was not argued by the plaintiffs.
22 '
The teachers defined the issue as whether the state could prohibit them
individually: Doyle K. Seawright, Douglas A. Johnson, DeWitte C. Gordon, and Glenna G.
James. 598 F.2d at 536.
The fifth member of the board, William Davis, was not named as a defendant. The Rev.
Davis was the only member of the board who voted against banning all 10 books. Minutes,
Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. 28-J, Aurora, Colo. Board of Education, Jan. 12, 1976. (The
minutes are available for public inspection at the Aurora School Administration building, 1085
Peoria St., Aurora, Colo.).
Prior to the board's action, Rev. Davis urged other board members to consider the legal
aspects of banning books "for reasons that are not clearly and soundly academic." The Denver
Post, Jan. 13, 1976, at 19. (All citations to articles in The Denver Post were written by the
author who was a newspaper reporter at the time of the book banning and regularly reported
the school board's actions).
214. 598 F.2d at 538.
215. Id.
216. The Denver Post, Nov. 5, 1975 at 16 (Zone 2 Section).
See also Taryle, Aurora Bd of Educ. Stages 'Best Show in Town,' The Denver Post, May 2, 1976,
at 23. (This signed editorial criticized some members of the school board for an inability to
assume a leadership role in the community because of a focus on religion and "fundamentalist
philosophy." It was also written by the author).
217. The Denver Post, Dec. 10, 1975 at 4 (Zone 2 Section). The president of the school
board, Doyle K. Seawright, had stated shortly after his election in May 1975 that he thought
boys and girls should be separated for sex education instruction. The Denver Post, May 21,
1975 at 22 (Zone 2 Section).
218. The Denver Post, Oct. 25, 1976, at 21. The motion to support the repeal of the Colo-
rado Equal Rights Amendment was turned down by the board 3-2.
219. The Denver Post, Jan. 12, 1977 at 3 (Zone 2 Section).
220. the Denver Post, April 7, 1976 at 6 (Zone 2 Section).
221. Plaintiffs' Brief and Combined Answer and Reply Brief of Appellants and Cross-Ap-
pellees, 598 F.2d 535, [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Reply Brief]. The plaintiffs were repre-
sented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colo., Inc., Denver, Colo.
For a case in which the issue of the establishment of a religion in violation of the first
amendment was crucial, see Epperson, discussed at notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
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from using non-obscene books222 based on "the personal predilections" of
school board members. Further, they contended that, when elective courses
were involved, it was constitutionally improper to uphold the ban, since the
board had no explanation other than a dislike for the material coupled with
a claim of absolute discretion to restrict conduct in the classroom. To rule
that the board had such a broad power would, the plaintiffs asserted, make
academic freedom "a nullity.
223
The school board defined the issue as whether the first amendment re-
quired the school board to allow textbook decisions to be made by individual
secondary teachers, despite a state law mandating the local school boards to
select books.224 In addition, the board indicated in its brief that the decision
to ban the books had been made because the board "believes these books to
be inappropriate," 225 hardly an enlightening explanation.
In finding for the board of education, the court of appeals held that it
was legitimate for the school district's curriculum to reflect the value system
of parents and taxpayers. It was proper for the state to delegate textbook
control to the board, and, while the board could not tailor the curriculum to
reflect a religious viewpoint, it was otherwise free to control instruction as it
saw fit. The school board was acting within its rights, even though the deci-
sion was political and influenced by its members' personal views.
226
B. The Tenth Circuit's Rationale
Although the Tenth Circuit, quoting from the briefs of the parties,
noted that the teachers and the board had defined the issue differently,22 7 it
did not explicitly resolve this difference by supplying its own statement of
the issue. It would have been possible for the court to focus more sharply the
issue to provide guidance for future school boards and courts considering this
sort of problem. The court could have stated the issue, for example, as did
the Second Circuit in Presidents CounciT,228 to be whether the constitutional
infringement was great enough to warrant an intrusion into the daily opera-
tions of a school district. It could then have devised a standard for measur-
ing the magnitude of such infringements.
The only constitutional prohibition suggested is provided in Judge Lo-
gan's statement that a school board cannot select books in a way that will
promote a religious viewpoint. Absent such a religious motivation, school
boards appear free to ban books, even though they have been used previ-
ously, and even though the decision is political and "influenced by the per-
sonal views" of board members.
229
The opinion cited decisions from other federal courts, including the
222. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 4.
223. Id. at 11-12.
224. Defendants' Brief at 10.
225. Id. at n. 1.
226. 598 F.2d at 543-44. Colorado statutes delegate control of curriculum and textbook
selection to local school boards. See notes 27 & 206 supra.
227. 598 F.2d at 542-43.
228. Discussed in notes 164-73 and accompanying text supra.
229. 598 F.2d at 544.
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landmark Supreme Court opinions dealing with academic freedom. How-
ever, in indicating the Supreme Court precedents which it found controlling,
the court, more often than not, failed to rely on majority opinions.
In citing Meyer,230 the court quoted from the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Holmes, who would have found it was reasonable to ban the teaching of
foreign languages. 2 31 The circuit also quoted the opinions of Justices Stew-
art and Black in Epperson,2 32 a case in which the two Justices, while concur-
ring, did not join in the majority opinion. 233 Justice Black concurred only
on the ground that he could have found the anti-evolution law void for
vagueness. 234 He would not have found that the law violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. Further, he could not "imagine" a rea-
son a state would be without power to withhold from its schools' curricula
"any subject deemed too emotional and controversial .... "235 Justice
Stewart found the law so vague as to be invalid under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
236
The Tenth Circuit also quoted a portion of Justice Frankfurter's con-
currence in Wieman v. Updegra9i, 237 indicating that teachers have the "special
task" of furthering critical inquiry and "open-mindedness" by their students.
The circuit court did not indicate, however, how its decision would enable
teachers to carry out that task.
The Cao , court also quoted the portion of the Tinker majority opinion
which stated that the first amendment does not allow school officials to take
action casting " 'a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom' " without compel-
ling reasons.2 38 In a later irreconcilable portion of the opinion, the Tenth
Circuit found that it was legitimate for a school board to censor curriculum
so as "to reflect the value system and educational emphasis which are the
collective will of those whose children are being educated and who are pay-
ing the costs." 239 This justification hardly seems to be of the nature man-
dated by the Supreme Court in Tinker. Equally unconvincing is the circuit's
statement that a board could justify its course offerings on the ground the
subjects to be taught were chosen with an eye toward promoting a "particu-
lar viewpoint."
'240
The circuit stated that secondary teachers have the freedoms previously
indicated by the Supreme Court. It also found that teachers cannot be
"made to simply read from a script prepared or approved by the board."'24 1
Yet, in the same opinion, the court found that a school board had absolute
authority to ban the study of any material it wished, without supplying a
230. Discussed in text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
231. 262 U.S. at 412.
232. Discussed in text accompanying notes 41-53 supra.
233. 598 F.2d at 540-41 (quoting from 393 U.S. at 113-16).
234. 393 U.S. at 114.
235. Id. at 112-13.
236. Id. at 116.
237. 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952).
238. 598 F.2d at 539.





constitutionally valid reason. Carried to its logical extreme, this rule would
appear to permit a board of education to select only one book for each class,
prohibiting the use of any other materials. Such a requirement would cer-
tainly appear to come close to relegating teachers to the role of script read-
ers, despite the court's statement to the contrary.
In the portion of Cay dealing with Supreme Court precedents, the
Tenth Circuit stated that most of the cases have "arisen at the university
level . .. ",242 This certainly is not true of the High Court opinions cited
by the circuit. Of the nine Supreme Court cases dealing with academic free-
dom to which the Tenth Circuit refers, only two- Kevishian and Wieman-
arose in a college or university setting. The other seven all involved contro-
versies in elementary or secondary schools. 243 Nor do the modern lower fed-
eral court decisions, either those cited 244 or others not treated in Car,
predominately involve university professors. In fact, most of the cases deal-
ing with curricular controls appear to have arisen in the secondary school
setting.2 4 5 Of the fourteen lower court decisions 246 cited by the circuit, thir-
teen involve the rights of secondary and elementary teachers and students.
Only one arose at an institution of higher education.
247
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's attempt to distinguish the secon-
dary school controversies from those arising in the university setting is that,
while the court indicates there is a difference, it does not address that differ-
ence in any way. Nor does it indicate any precedent of any court that would
aid in establishing guidelines for evaluating the claims of either secondary
teachers or university professors. If this difference is essential, as the court of
appeals implied, then the circuit should have delineated the difference. The
court appears to justify its holding in Cary on the basis that the case involved
high school students. While some differences in approach undoubtedly can
be justified on this basis,248 the court did not clearly indicate how much it
242. Id. at 539.
243. The seven Supreme Court cases cited which dealt with controversies at the elementary
and secondary levels were Tinker, Shelton, Meyer, Bartels, Epperson, Barnette, and Rodriguez, id. at
539-43, discussed in notes 16-87 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of academic
freedom in higher education, see Kutner, The Freedom of Academic Freedom. A Legal Dilemma, 48
CHI-KENT L. REV. 168 (1971).
244. 598 F.2d at 541-43.
245. The lower federal court opinions in which curricular or teaching method controls were
at issue are discussed in notes 100-163 and accompanying text supra.
246. Of the fourteen lower federal court cases cited by the Tenth Circuit, eleven are dis-
cussed in notes 88-201 and accompanying text supra. Adams v. Campbell County School Dist.,
is discussed in text accompanying notes 253-58 in/a.
The remaining two cases cited involve what may be termed "outrageous conduct" by high
school teachers. In Moore v. School Bd. of Gulf County, 364 F. Supp. 355, 358-59 (N.D. Fla.
1973), the discharged teacher had related his personal sexual experiences to students during
class. In Ahern v. Bd. of School Dist. of Grand Island, 456 F.2d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1972), the
teacher was fired after she turned over control of her classes to students, referred to a substitute
teacher as a "bitch" in front of students, and ignored administrator's instructions.
247. Clark v. Holmes, discussed at notes 128-33 and accompanying text inf/a.
248. See Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Or. 1976), in which the court
distinguishes the role of college professors from that of elementary and secondary teachers on
the ground that the former engage in a search for knowledge, while the latter "merely dissemi-
nate knowledge." See also Developments, supra note 12 at 1053.
The Second Circuit, in James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972), stated that the role of an elementary and secondary teacher is indoctrinative.
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relied on this factor.
One of the cited lower court opinions, Parker, appears not to be a viable
precedent today. 249 The case was cited with a group of others in which
teachers were fired. Judge Logan indicated that the cases in which courts
found in favor of teachers could be distinguished because they were situa-
tions in which school authorities did not have a general policy proscribing
the use of the materials involved. None of these precedents were discussed.
In citing both the cases in which discharges were upheld and those in which
the decisions of school authorities were overturned, the circuit did not indi-
cate that it was following either group, beyond distinguishing the pro-
teacher cases in one sentence. 250 Nor did the court explain why it chose to
disregard the discharge cases in which courts found, on academic freedom
grounds, that there was a right of teachers to some choice in selecting teach-
ing methods and curricular content. 25' The opinion did not even explicitly
indicate that it was choosing to follow precedents such as Presidents Council
and Brubaker, rather than those like Minarcini and Keefe. The Cagy rationale
would have been stronger if the court had indicated which of the other cir-
cuits it was following and given its reasons for doing so, as did the Sixth
Circuit in Presidents Council .
2 5 2
The circuit indicates that it is following its own precedent, established
in Adams v. Campbell County School District,25 3 the only Tenth Circuit prece-
dent cited in Cag. In Adams, high school teachers whose contracts were not
renewed argued that they were fired in violation of their first amendment
rights because of the wearing of an arm band to mourn soldiers killed in
Vietnam, and discussing the war and flag burning, and because they were
suspected of assisting in publication of an underground newspaper. The Ad-
ams trial court accepted the defendants' explanation that the non-renewal of
the contracts was due to poor teaching practices, and not because the plain-
tiffs had exercised their first amendment rights.254 The Tenth Circuit, while
finding the trial court's findings to be supported,2 5 5 stated that teachers
"[u]ndoubtedly .. .have some freedom in the [teaching] techniques to be
employed . . . ." However, this freedom is not without limits, "at least at
the secondary level." '2 56 It is this portion of Adams that is quoted in Cagy.
2 5 7
However, it is interesting that the circuit relied on a teacher discharge case
in Adams, while rejecting other discharge cases, those in which teachers were
reinstated, on the ground that they involved situations in which school au-
thorities did not have a general policy prohibiting the use of the materials at
However, despite a statement that school boards have wide latitude in matters of discipline, the
court found that the board did not have the "unfettered discretion to violate fundamental con-
stitutional rights." Id. at 575. The circuit found that the board could not fire a teacher who
wore an armband in protest of the Vietnam war without infringing on those rights. Id. at 568.
249. See, e.g., Kqrhtman, discussed in notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
250. 598 F.2d at 541-42.
251. Id.
252. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
253. 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975).
254. Id. at 1244-45.
255. Id. at 1248.
256. Id. at 1247.
257. 598 F.2d at 543-44.
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issue. The Cay court does not mention the portion of Adams that indicates
some kind of findings are necessary, at least in teacher discharge cases in
which first amendment rights are asserted. The Adams court found that it
was permissible for the school board to adopt the recommendations of school
administrators rather than supplying its own findings. 258 This indicates that
some kind of a statement of reasons for the board's action is needed. Apply-
ing the findings requirement to a situation in which there has been no dis-
charge, as other courts have done,259 the board should have stated reasons
for the ban. While the board in Cag might have been able to adopt the
reasons of the textbook committee's minority faction to explain its ban of six
of the ten books, there were four books that the board culled itself, which
were, incidently, not discussed in the minority report. 260 Therefore, no ex-
planation was given for the banning of four of the volumes.
Judge Doyle, in a brief concurrence, 261 indicated that he would not
approve arbitrary choices of books. He further noted that the majority opin-
ion could be read as prohibiting such selections. Judge Doyle went on to
state:
The approach which I prefer would be that the exclusion of books
for secondary school students is not to be an arbitrary exclusion.
Therefore, reasons have to be given so that there can be court re-
view. If they [the books] are excluded because the Board member
disapproves for a subjective reason, I would say that this is an un-
lawful and unconstitutional invasion of the classroom.
262
The judge's concurrence made a valid point. While the court of appeals
might have decided that the book ban was constitutionally permissible after
reviewing the board's reasons for its action, the Tenth Circuit should not
have given judicial approval to an action that might have been arbitrary or
based on some other constitutionally impermissible ground. Although the
parties agreed that the board's action was not the result of an attempt to
exclude a particular theory or type of book, 263 it would seem that, in the face
of a constitutional claim alleging censorship, the court should have asked for
more in the way of justification of the action.
V. THE SEARCH FOR GUIDELINES: A SUGGESTED TEST
Courts have failed to establish guidelines for evaluating secondary cur-
ricular and textbook decisions made by local school authorities. The test
suggested below is intended to be broad enough to be used in both the book
banning controversies and in the teacher discharge situations.
264
The proposed test is a method of inquiry for resolving whether contro-
258. 511 F.2d at 1245.
259. Minarcani and Wilson are discussed in notes 191-97, 178-88, and 160-63 mnfra.
260. 598 F.2d at 537.
261. Id. at 544 (Doyle, J., concurring).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. It is assumed at the outset that a court, in applying the proposed test, would not reach
such an inquiry if the school board has based its decision on a coinstitutionally prohibited
ground. For example, the test would not be used in a case in which it were established that
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verted secondary materials can be subjected to censorship by school officials.
This subjective test has two major prongs: the maturity of the students and
the appropriateness of the materials. Two questions should be asked by a
court when it attempts to resolve a controversy involving teaching materials
or methods:
1) Were the students to whom the material or teaching method
was directed generaly mature enough to handle the material and/or
method without any adverse effects?; and
2) Was the material or method appropriate in the classroom or
school setting in which it was used?
If the answer to both questions is yes, then the board's ban on the use of
the materials or discharge of a teacher should be reversed. When the answer
to either question is no, then the school board's action should be upheld.
The two prongs of the test are discussed separately below. In addition,
there are several other factors that a court could consider in borderline cases
in which it is difficult to answer either or both questions.
A. The Maturity of the Students
While there have been significant changes in secondary education dur-
ing the past several decades, 265 it has been recognized that there still is less
academic freedom at the high school level than in higher education.
266
While there have been indications that secondary teachers are expected to
officials had based their decision on a desire to further the tenets of a particular religion. See the
discussion of Epperson in notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
For another author's suggestion of a test to be used in evaluating claims relating to
teacher's in-class expression, see Standards, supra note 54 at 857-97.
265. Dring the same time that academic freedom has become recognized as a constitution-
ally protected interest, rapid changes have occurred in elementary and secondary education.
See J. BRUBACHER, A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION 633-34 (1947) (cited in the
Amici Curiae Brief of National Education Ass'n, Colorado Educational Ass'n, and the Aurora
Educational Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as BRUBACHER]; CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE SCHOOL 116-17 (1962). Many more courses are offered in high schools than were a century
ago. R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 342 (1963). The number of
students who go to college has increased significantly in recent decades. HISTORICAL STATIS-
TICS OF THE U.S., COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL ED. PT. I at 379 (1975); AMERI-
CAN COUNCIL ON EDUC., FACT BOOK ON HIGHER EDUCATION, table 76.79 (1976). As a result,
high schools increasingly have assumed the burden of college preparation, offering electives
similar to courses formerly offered only on college campuses. G. HILLOCKS, ALTERNATIVES IN
ENGLISH: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ELECTIVE PROGRAMS 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hill-
ocks]. See also Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
Changes also have occurred in the qualifications of teachers, and in their use of materials.
Nineteenth century teachers concentrated on the basic facts, were not well trained, and did not
assert the right of academic freedom. BRUBACHER, supra at 633-34. However, the situation
changed in the twentieth century. By 1971, only 1.1 percent of U.S. secondary teachers did not
have a college degree, while more than a third had a masters degree. NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS Table 53 at 56 (1976). These teachers in-
creasingly found it necessary to use a wide range of materials, rather than limiting themselves to
only one standardized text. Since the early 1940s, when paperback books became more avail-
able, such books have become a resource for teachers, with some instructors choosing to assign
them in their classes directly, rather than relying on them only for outside study. A. APPLEBEE,
TRADITION AND REFORM IN THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH: A HISTORY 207 (1974); J. LYNCH &
B. EVANS, HIGH SCHOOL ENGLISH TEXTBOOKS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 61-62 (1963).
266. While there have been significant changes in education, it has been recognized that
there still is less academic freedom at the high school level than in higher education. See Develop-
ments, supra note 12 at 1050, 1098. The Tenth Circuit recognized this distinction in Adams when
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concentrate on transmitting basic information, there also has been recogni-
tion that minors, as they approach college age, should not be overly pro-
tected. Some courts have implied that the increased maturity of today's
students is a factor which should be considered in evaluating what teaching
materials or methods may be used.
26 7
Although age is one aspect of maturity, the latter should be used as the
standard because it is flexible. If the next generation of secondary students
mature faster than did their parents, the standard will change. Also, matur-
ity is intended to take into account the sophistication of the community, 268
since it is to be expected that students in some communities-probably more
urbanized areas--mature intellectually at a faster rate than those in others.
In considering the level of maturity, the courts should attempt, how-
ever, to focus closely on the students themselves, rather than the conceptions
of their parents in this regard. In some instances, school board members and
parents may be shocked by materials or methods that would not offend or
harm their children in the least. Courts also should make certain that a
school board is not arguing for low level of maturity on the part of students
to excuse a decision made on the basis of the political, social, or personal
tastes of board members.
269
It should be noted that, in the library book cases, the maturity of the
students is likely to be the controlling factor. This is because the second
prong of the test, appropriateness, is likely to be impossible to either establish
or disprove. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the removal of a
book could be justified on the ground that the volume is inappropriate for
any topic that could be discussed in any course offered in the school.
it stated that secondary teachers have "some freedom" in teaching methods, but do not have an
unlimited right to determine course content. 511 F.2d at 1247.
The Mailloux court indicated that, at the secondary level, school authorities are more
clearly acting in a role of n loco parentis, since most students are minors. The court commented
that secondary schools are more closely governed, and their faculty members do not have the
wide discretion of college professors. Most members of the community expect secondary teach-
ers to concentrate on transmitting information and, at least to some extent, "indoctrinate" chil-
dren in societal values. 323 F. Supp. at 1392. See the discussion of Mailloux at notes 120-26 and
accompanying text supra.
267. The Keefe court did not believe that high school seniors had to be safeguarded from
reading obscene words. If the students needed such shielding, "we would fear for their future,"
the court stated. 418 F.2d at 361. See the discussion of Keefe at notes 101-10 and accompanying
text supra. The WiIson court noted that modern-day high school students are "suprisingly so-
phisticated, intelligent, and discerning." 418 F. Supp. at 1368. Such students are "far from easy
prey" and will not be harmed by exposure to nontraditional or even Unamerican theories of
thought. Id. at 1368, 1361. The Second Circuit, in James v. Bd. of Educ., noted that 18-year-
olds have the right to vote and commented that it would be "foolhardy to shield our children
from political debate and issues until the eve of their first venture into the voting booth." 461
F.2d 574. See note 248 supra for a discussion ofJames.
268. Cf Adams, 511 F.2d at 1247, in which the Tenth Circuit recognized that the approach
to evaluating first amendment claims at the secondary level might depend, at least in part, on
the community standards. The court stated that, in a small community such as the one in-
volved, school authorities "have a right to emphasize a more orthodox approach .... " Id.
269. This problem was indicated as a concern by the court in Mzarcini, discussed at notes
178-88 and accompanying text supra. 541 F.2d at 582.
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B. Appropriateness of the Teaching Material or Method
The second major area of inquiry, appropriateness of the material or
method, often-but not always-will be the same as relevance to the course
topic. Both relevance and appropriateness have been used as standards by
the courts in evaluating curricular restraints. 270 Appropriateness is used
rather than relevance because the latter would appear to indicate the accept-
ability of materials only when they are shown to have a direct relationship to
the course title or to a specific topic of inquiry in a specific class. Appropri-
ateness in the classroom or school setting is intended to be broader so as to
include, for example, a discussion that might arise as a result of a legitimate
question asked by a student. The term also indicates considerations of the
obscenity or non-obscenity of materials or methods, since those of an obscene
nature would appear to be per se inappropriate.
2 7 1
C. Other Factors to Consider
The maturity-appropriateness test incorporates most of the considera-
tions that should be weighed in resolving curricular and book disputes at the
secondary level, but the two prongs are not exclusive. In borderline cases,
there are other factors that could tip the scales.
One such consideration is the testimony of experts, if any.27 2 Such testi-
mony would most likely indicate the experts' opinions as to the students'
maturity and the appropriateness of the material or method. Another fac-
tor, which ordinarily would be applied only in the teacher discharge cases, is
the disruptive effect of the use of the materials or methods.273 This factor
usually would not be considered in book banning cases, since it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which the stocking of a book in the school library or
classroom would disrupt school discipline.
Still another consideration in some cases will be whether the contro-
verted materials or method is used in an elective class or in a required
270. In Mailloux, discussed in notes 120-26 and accompanying text supra, the district court
recognized that the use of a "taboo word" was "relevant" to the teaching of high school English.
323 F. Supp. 1389. In an Eighth Circuit case, a mathematics teacher's comments about Army
recruiters were said to be "irrelevant" to the class curriculum. Birdwell v. Hazelwood, 491 F.2d
490, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1974). The court in Parducci, discussed in notes 111-19 and accompanying
text in/ia, indicated that it found a story assigned by a teacher to be "appropriate for high
school students ...." 316 F. Supp. at 356. The Wison court found that the use of political
speakers was not "inappropriate." 418 F. Supp. at 1364. See notes 160-63 and accompanying
text supra.
271. Some courts have applied the Supreme Court's obscenity standard as enunciated in
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629. See discussion at note 105 supra. For cases in which courts have applied
Ginsberg to secondary curricular disputes, see Keefe and Parducci, discussed in notes 100-19 and
accompanying text supra.
272. For a case in which the opinions of experts were disregarded, see Brubaker, discussed at
notes 134-45 and accompanying text supra. Contra, Sterring discussed in notes 146-48 and accom-
panying text supra.
273. The Supreme Court indicated in Tinker that actual or threatened disruption of school
discipline is to be weighed in considering the validity of prior restraints in the school setting. See
discussion at notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra. For a case in which disruptiveness was
considered, see Keefe, discussed at notes 101-10 supra.
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course. 2 74 This factor is relevant because students and their parents can con-
trol whether the student enrolls in an elective course, thereby eliminating a
situation in which a student is forced to be exposed to ideas or words that he
or his parents find offensive. Similarly, when the controversy involves mater-
ials, the court can consider whether or not the student is offered a meaning-
ful opportunity to select alternative materials to fulfill course
requirements.
2 75
A final factor which could be weighed is whether the offending material
or method is used in a college preparatory course. This is relevant because
many school districts today offer classes with subject matter similar to that
studied at the college level as a way of preparing students for a higher educa-
tion.27 6 Since the content of these courses more closely resembles the college
curriculum than it does the typical high school offering, it would seem logi-
cal to allow more latitude to teachers.
It is time for the courts to apply a uniform means of resolving disputes
involving teaching materials and methods at the secondary level. The use of
such a test for weighing the competing interests in curricular controversies
would help to establish the contours for the important new right of academic




274. All of the banned books in Caty were proposed for use in elective courses. 598 F.2d at
537.
275. It is assumed that, if a student or his parents objected to materials, the student would
be excused from the assignment. In Cary, any student could request and receive an alternate
assignment. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 30.
276. HILOCKS, supra note 265, at 29-30.
277. Set note 39 supra.
* The author wishes to thank Prof. William M. Beaney of the University of Denver
College of Law for his generous assistance and criticism. The author also would like to thank
Robert J. Truhlar for his assistance.
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